The Untold Secrets of Operational Wi-Fi Calling Services:
  Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures by Xie, Tian et al.
The Untold Secrets of Operational Wi-Fi Calling Services:
Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures
TIAN XIE,Michigan State University
GUAN-HUA TU,Michigan State University
BANGJIE YIN,Michigan State University
CHI-YU LI, National Chiao Tung University
CHUNYI PENG, Purdue University
MI ZHANG,Michigan State University
HUI LIU,Michigan State University
XIAOMING LIU,Michigan State University
Since 2016, all of four major U.S. operators have rolled out nationwide Wi-Fi calling services. They are projected to surpass
VoLTE (Voice over LTE) and other VoIP services in terms of mobile IP voice usage minutes in 2018. They enable mobile users
to place cellular calls over Wi-Fi networks based on the 3GPP IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) technology. Compared with
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designs, device implementation issues and network operation slips. By exploiting the vulnerabilities, together with several
state-of-the-art computer visual recognition technologies, we devise two proof-of-concept attacks: user privacy leakage and
telephony harassment or denial of voice service (THDoS); both of them can bypass the security defenses deployed on mobile
devices and the network infrastructure. We have confirmed their feasibility and simplicity using real-world experiments, as
well as assessed their potential damages and proposed recommended solutions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since 2016, all of four major operators in the U.S., T-Mobile, AT&T, Verizon and Sprint, have launched their
nationwide Wi-Fi calling services [33]1. The Wi-Fi calling technology utilizes the 3GPP IMS (IP Multimedia
Subsystem) system [4] to provide a packet-switched voice service over Wi-Fi networks. It enables mobile users to
have cellular calls and text messages through their home/public Wi-Fi networks instead of cellular base stations.
It is considered as an alternative voice solution for the mobile users with weak signals of base stations. A recent
Cisco report [19] forecasts that the Wi-Fi calling is going to surpass VoLTE (Voice over LTE) and VoIP (Voice over
IP, e.g., Microsoft Skype and Google Hangouts) services by 2018 in terms of voice usage minutes. By 2020, the
Wi-Fi calling will take 53% of mobile IP voice service usage (about 9,000 billions of minutes per year), whereas the
VoLTE and other VoIP services will have only 26% and 21%, respectively. As a result, any security loopholes of
the Wi-Fi calling can lead to devastating consequences on a global scale due to its rapid global deployment [10].
We believe that there is a critical need for a security investigation on Wi-Fi calling services.
Technically, Wi-Fi calling services differ from the proprietary VoIP services such as Skype or other SIP-based
(Session Initiation Protocol) voice services. Though its signaling protocol is also SIP-based, it is a 3GPP-specific
version [30, 37]. For security reasons, both 3GPP and GSMA stipulate that Wi-Fi calling services shall use well-
examined SIM-based security (i.e., storing each user’s private secret key in a physical card) and authentication
methods (i.e., 3GPP AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) [8]), which are employed by the VoLTE. In addition,
all the Wi-Fi calling signaling and voice/text packets shall be delivered through IPSec (Internet Protocol Security)
channels between Wi-Fi calling devices and the cellular network infrastructure, since they may cross public,
insecure networks. To defend against Wi-Fi DoS (Denial-of-Service) attacks (e.g., all the Wi-Fi calling packets are
discarded by malicious Wi-Fi networks), the Wi-Fi calling employs a system-switch security mechanism, which
switches Wi-Fi calling users back to cellular-based voice/text services when the users are unreachable through
Wi-Fi networks.
Given these security mechanisms, which have been well studied in the VoLTE [39] and cellular networks [14]
for years, it seems that the Wi-Fi calling should be as secure as the VoLTE. Unfortunately, it is not the case. We
have identified several security threats in the Wi-Fi calling services deployed by T-Mobile, Verizon and AT&T in
the U.S. The threats can be attributed to design defects of Wi-Fi calling standards, implementation issues of Wi-Fi
calling devices, and operational slips of cellular networks. Specifically, we discover four vulnerabilities. First,
Wi-Fi calling devices do not exclude insecure Wi-Fi networks which may impede their Wi-Fi calling services
from their selection (V1). Second, they do not defend against ARP spoofing/poisoning attacks, which can be
exploited to launch various MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) attacks (V2). Third, the Wi-Fi calling traffic, which is
protected by the IPSec, is still vulnerable to side-channel attacks (e.g., privacy leakage) (V3). Fourth, even when
the performance of a Wi-Fi calling call is bad (e.g., voice is muted), the mechanism of service continuity across
the Wi-Fi calling and the cellular-based voice services does not take effect (V4). They are summarized in Table 1.
We exploit these four vulnerabilities to devise two proof-of-concept attacks: (1) user privacy leakage and
(2) telephony harassment or denial of voice service attack (THDoS). They can bypass the existing security
mechanisms on the Wi-Fi calling devices and the network infrastructure. Note that in our threat model, the
adversary has no control over the Wi-Fi network used by the victim, the victim’s Wi-Fi calling device, or the
cellular network infrastructure.
1It is also named as VoWiFi (Voice over Wi-Fi).
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Category Vulnerability Type Root Cause
Device
V1: Wi-Fi calling devices do not exclude inse-
cure Wi-Fi networks from their selection.
Design defect
Current 3GPPWi-Fi network selectionmechanism [6, 33] considers only
the connectivity capabilities of Wi-Fi networks, but not their security
risks (Section 3.1).
V2: Wi-Fi calling devices do not defend against
ARP spoofing/poisoning attacks.
Implementation
issue
Wi-Fi calling devices do not advance theWi-Fi security forWi-Fi calling
services (Section 3.1).
Infrastructure
V3: the Wi-Fi calling traffic, which is protected
by the IPSec, is still vulnerable to side-channel
attacks (e.g., privacy leakage).
Operation slip
For all three carriers, T-Mobile, AT&T, and Verizon, the IPSec session
between mobile devices and the core network carries only Wi-Fi calling
traffic, so traffic patterns can be learned to infer different events easily.
(Section 3.1).
V4: service continuity is not updated accord-
ingly. Design defect
The triggers of 3GPP SRVCC/DRVCC [3–5] procedures, which keep
service continuity across different radio access technologies, consider
only radio quality but not service quality (Section 3.2).
Table 1. Summary of identified security vulnerabilities.
For the user privacy leakage, we develop a Wi-Fi calling user privacy inference system (UIPS), which employs
several state-of-the-art computer visual recognition technologies. It can infer a verify of user privacy including
Wi-Fi user identifiers (e.g., names), call statistics, Wi-Fi calling device addresses (i.e., IP addresses), device
information (e.g., Apple iPhone8), user activities (e.g., accessing CNN.com), and applications running on the
device (e.g., Wechat). Note that call statistics have been proven effective to infer a user’s personality (e.g.,
conscientiousness [27]), mood (e.g., stressful [54]), and behavior (e.g., dialing spamming calls [12]). For the
THDoS attack, we devise four attack variances against Wi-Fi calling users: annoying-incoming-call, zombie-call,
mute voice call, and telephony denial-of-voice-service. We further propose solutions to address these security
threats.
In summary, this paper makes three main contributions.
(1) We conduct the first security study to explore the dark side of operational Wi-Fi calling services in three
major U.S. operators’ networks (i.e., T-Mobile, AT&T, and Verizon) using commodity devices. We identify
four vulnerabilities which root in design defects of Wi-Fi calling standards, operational slips of operators,
and implementation issues of Wi-Fi calling devices.
(2) We devise two proof-of-concept attacks by exploiting the identified vulnerabilities, together with several
computer visual recognition technologies. We further assess their impacts in those three U.S. carriers’
networks.
(3) We identify diversified root causes and propose recommended solutions. The lessons learned can facilitate
and secure the global deployment of Wi-Fi calling services.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background of Wi-Fi calling technology
and possible security threats, as well as our threat model and methodology. Section 3 discloses the discovered
vulnerabilities of Wi-Fi calling services. Sections 4 and 5 show the proof-of-concept attacks, user privacy leakage
and the THDoS, respectively. We propose recommended solutions in Section 6 and review related work in
Section 7. Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 WHAT MAY PROBABLY GO WRONG?
In this section, we introduce the support of the Wi-Fi calling service in cellular networks, and its possible security
threats. We then present the threat model and the experimental methodology of this work.
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Fig. 1. The 4G LTE network architecture that supports the Wi-Fi calling service.
2.1 Wi-Fi calling Primer
The Wi-Fi calling technology enables mobile users to consume cellular-based voice services through Wi-Fi
networks. It is an alternative voice solution for the conditions of poor cellular signals, which can be caused by
insufficient coverage from limited base stations. By design, it is similar to most VoIP (Voice over IP) services
by using the SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) as its signaling protocol. But, its SIP requires some 3GPP-specific
modifications ([30, 37]) and it is supported by the cellular core network.
Figure 1 illustrates a simplified network architecture that runs both Wi-Fi calling and VoLTE services. Both
Wi-Fi calling and VoLTE users use the same infrastructure consisting of two parts: Radio Access Network (RAN)
and Core Network (CN). Unlike the VoLTE that leverages eNodeB as its RAN, the Wi-Fi calling adopts the Wi-Fi
Access Point (AP), which forwards its packets to the CN through the Internet. The UE (User Equipment) can
dynamically choose the Wi-Fi calling or the VoLTE as its voice service. The CN consists of six main components:
the ePDG (Evolved Packet Data Gateway), the PDN-GW (Public Data Network Gateway), the MME (Mobility
Management Entity), the S-GW (Servicing Gateway), the AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting)
server, and the IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) servers. The ePDG is newly deployed for the Wi-Fi calling service,
whereas the other components are shared by the Wi-Fi calling and the VoLTE.
For the security of the Wi-Fi calling service, each UE has to be authenticated by the ePDG with the AAA
server’s assistance. Afterwards, the ePDG establishes an IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) tunnel with the UE
for their secure communication. The ePDG then forwards packets between the UE, the PDN-GW and the IMS
servers, which offer the Wi-Fi calling service.
2.2 Possible Security Threats
The radio access of the Wi-Fi calling technology relies on the Wi-Fi, but not the cellular base stations fully
controlled by operators. It naturally raises some security concerns. Is the Wi-Fi calling technology as secure as the
traditional voice service? In particular, we start with the following two questions.
Q1. DoWi-Fi calling devices still activateWi-Fi calling services while associating with insecureWi-Fi networks?
Q2. If yes, do any security mechanisms exist on the devices or/and the network infrastructure to defend against
possible security threats? Moreover, can they be completely eliminated?
Unfortunately, we disclose that operational Wi-Fi calling services, as well as their technical supports behind, are
not bullet-proof. Wi-Fi calling devices do not avoid activating Wi-Fi calling services in insecure Wi-Fi networks
(Q1); although the devices and the infrastructure provide security mechanisms against some malicious attacks
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(e.g., DoS attacks), they do not defend against all the threats(Q2). We then uncover vulnerabilities from four
findings in three aspects: design defects in the standard, operational slips from the operator’s network, and the
device’s implementation issues. We elaborate on each finding with its correlative vulnerability in Section 3.
2.3 Threat model
In this work, the victim is a mobile user whose device has the Wi-Fi calling service and associates with a Wi-Fi
AP. The adversary can be anyone who has a networked device under the same subnet as the victim. S(he) does
not need to associate with the Wi-Fi AP that the victim connects. Take a campus network as an example. The
adversary needs to connect to the campus network but can be anywhere on the campus, whereas the victim can
associate with any campus AP. They are under the same subnet of the campus’ network gateway. The adversary
does not have any IPSec keys of the victim and is not able to access the victim’s device or the cellular network
infrastructure. The device software/hardware and the infrastructure are not compromised.
2.4 Methodology
We validate vulnerabilities and attacks on three major U.S. carriers: T-Mobile, Verizon and AT&T. They launch
Wi-Fi calling services since 2013, 2016 and 2016 respectively. They together take more than 75% of market
share [52] in the U.S. We conduct experiments using a software-based Wi-Fi AP on a MacBook Pro 2014 laptop,
an ASUS RT-AC1900 Wi-Fi AP, and eight popular mobile devices with Wi-Fi calling services, which include
Samsung Galaxy S6/S7/S8/J7, Apple iPhone6/iPhone7/iPhone8, and Google Nexus 6P. Apple and Samsung take
74% of market share [20]. The experiments are done in several campus Wi-Fi networks including Michigan State
University, New York University, University of California Berkeley, and Northeastern University.
We understand that some feasibility tests and attack evaluations might be harmful to the operators and/or
users. As a result, we proceed with this study in a responsible manner by running experiments in fully controlled
environments. In all the experiments, victims are always our lab members. Instead of aggravating the damages
caused by new security vulnerabilities and attacks, we seek to disclose them and then provide effective solutions.
3 HOW DOES IT GO WRONG?
In this section, we answer the aforementioned two questions in details by disclosing our four findings with their
corresponding vulnerabilities. Then these vulnerabilities are analyzed and examined in the standard, operator
networks and device implementations.
3.1 Q1: Do Wi-Fi calling devices still activate Wi-Fi calling services while associating with insecure
Wi-Fi networks?
To answer this question, we seek to examine whether the selection policy of Wi-Fi networks on the Wi-Fi calling
devices consider security impacts or not, in addition to the performance issues involving the quality of Wi-Fi link
and Internet connectivity. However, it is not the case due to the discovery of three security vulnerabilities, so
the answer to Q1 is yes. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, an adversary is able to intercept the packets of the
Wi-Fi calling service for one victim, as well as then infer service events of his/her ongoing Wi-Fi calling call and
manipulate the delivery of the service packets.
Vulnerability 1 (V1). This is a design defect in the standards [6, 33]. We discover that Wi-Fi calling devices are
unable to exclude an insecure Wi-Fi network from their Wi-Fi network candidates due to the network selection
mechanism of the Wi-Fi calling.
There are two Wi-Fi network selection modes: manual and automatic modes. In the manual mode, devices
maintain a prioritized list of selected Wi-Fi networks, the implementation of which is vendor-specific. In the
automatic mode, devices select their connected Wi-Fi networks by following the guidance from the network
ACM Trans. Priv. Sec., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: November 2018.
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No.   | Time          | Source         | Destination    | Protocol  | Length   | Info
440    56.276919   208.54.16.4     192.168.2.5      ESP           176            ESP (SPI=0xbb21253b)
441    56.266969   208.54.16.4     192.168.2.5      ESP           176            ESP (SPI=0xbb21253b)
465    56.316883   192.168.2.5     208.54.16.4      ESP           176            ESP (SPI=0x0855c9c8)
468    56.337334   192.168.2.5     208.54.16.4      ESP           176            ESP (SPI=0x0855c9c8)
469    56.347763   208.54.16.4     192.168.2.5      ESP           176            ESP (SPI=0xbb21253b)
470    56.348012   208.54.16.4     192.168.2.5      ESP           176            ESP (SPI=0xbb21253b)
Fig. 2. A trace of intercepting Wi-Fi calling packets through the ARP spoofing.
infrastructure based on the ANDSF (Access Network Discovery and Selection Function) [7]. The selection is
mainly based on connectivity capabilities (specified in the IEEE Standard 802.11-2012 [2]) and radio qualities
(e.g., ThreshBeaconRSSIWLANLow [6]) of available Wi-Fi networks. Both modes do not consider security factors
of their selected Wi-Fi networks (i.e., whether the Wi-Fi networks are vulnerable or compromised). As a result,
Wi-Fi calling devices may select insecure Wi-Fi networks for their Wi-Fi calling services.
Vulnerability 2 (V2). This is a common security loophole in the implementation of Wi-Fi calling devices. We
find that all of our test Wi-Fi calling devices suffer from the ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) spoofing/poisoning
attack, which is usually the prerequisite of variousMITM (Man-In-The-Middle) attacks. In the attack, the adversary
masquerades as the default gateway by sending fabricated ARP reply messages which associate its MAC address
with the gateway’s IP address onto a local area network. All of the local devices’ packets can be then sent to
the adversary instead of the gateway. It allows the adversary to intercept all the packets belonging to the Wi-Fi
calling devices.
Vulnerability 3 (V3). This is an operational issue from Wi-Fi calling service operators. We discover that the
Wi-Fi calling is the only service carried by the IPSec channel between the UE and the ePDG (shown in Figure 1),
and it may be exploited to leak user privacy by monitoring the channel. It allows the adversary to launch a
side-channel attack by inferring the Wi-Fi calling service events (e.g., call status and text messaging status). This
vulnerability exists in all of our test operators.
3.1.1 Validation. We next validate these three vulnerabilities.
V1. We validate V1 by deploying an insecure Wi-Fi network using a Wi-Fi router which does not defend
against ARP spoofing attacks. We test whether each of our Wi-Fi calling devices keeps connecting to it, while
using one host to launch an ARP spoofing attack where the host masqueraded as the tested device. Our result
shows that all the tested devices do not disassociate from the router or terminate their Wi-Fi calling services
including dialing calls and text messaging. It causes all the downlink Wi-Fi packets towards the devices to be
intercepted by the host so that they can be inspected, dropped, or manipulated with other actions.
V2. To validate V2, we examine whether the tested devices can be resistant to the ARP spoofing attack. We
employ a tool, EtterCap, to send spoofed ARP messages, which claim one host as the default gateway, to all the
Wi-Fi calling devices in the network. It leads all the devices to send uplink packets to the host instead of the
gateway. The host can thus intercept all the uplink Wi-Fi calling packets.
Note that by exploiting V1 and V2, an adversary who does not have full control of Wi-Fi networks is able to
intercept all the Wi-Fi calling packets with his/her device (as shown in Figure 2). However, we do not observe
any alerts or warnings from the Wi-Fi calling devices. More threateningly, the adversary is not required to stay
within the radio coverage (e.g., 300 feet) of the Wi-Fi APs with which victims associate. More discussions will be
given in Section 5.3.
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SIP Message
Ipsec Packet
1304    38.827132  2607:fc20:49   fd00:976a:1   SIP            1132      Request: BYE sip:sgc_c@[FD00:976A:14FB:57::1]:65529     
No.     |Time           |Source            |Destination  |Protocol| Length| Info
                                                 ESP           1200      ESP (SPI=0x09960417)   
32      16.894215   208.54.83.96  192.168.29.211  ESP            1360     ESP (SPI=0x00451590)
37      16.896092   fd00:976a:1  2607:fc20:49     SIP            1132      Request: INVITE sip:15174024559@[2607:fc20:49:1f4c...
98      17.315048   192.168.29.211 208.54.83.96   ESP           1152     ESP (SPI=0x09960417)
97      17.314491   2607:fc20:49...  fd00:976a:1...  SIP            1084      Status: 180 Ringing | 
Ipsec Packet
SIP Message
Fig. 4. A trace of Wi-Fi calling packets: SIP and IPSec packets collected on a test phone.
V3. We examine whether any information can be inferred based on the intercepted Wi-Fi calling packets,
which are encrypted by the IPSec. After analyzing their patterns, we discover that there are six service events
in all the three operators’ Wi-Fi calling services: dialing/receiving a call, sending/receiving a text message, and
activating/deactivating the service.
Figure 3 shows the IPSec packets captured on our Wi-Fi AP from an experiment, where we trigger the
aforementioned six events on a test phone. It is observed that all the events differ from each other in terms of
various traffic patterns, which are composed of packet direction (uplink or downlink), packet size, and packets
interval. In order to identify and classify them based on encrypted Wi-Fi traffic, we apply a decision tree method,
the C4.5 algorithm [45]. To prepare a set of training data for the C4.5 algorithm, we repeat the aforementioned six
Wi-Fi calling service operations on the test phone with 50 runs and collect all the IPSec packets of the phone on
the Wi-Fi AP. Based on the training data, we use the C4.5 to generate a model to classify the events. We validate
the result of the decision tree for each test by comparing it with the test phone’s trace, as shown in Figure 4. We
can get 100% accuracy for 50 tests. Note that the trace is collected from the phone, Nexus 6P, with T-Mobile Wi-Fi
calling service.
We next examine whether the classification model works for cross-phone/cross-carrier cases. We consider
various devices with the Wi-Fi calling services of three carriers. The results are summarized in Table 4. It is
observed that those six events in all the test cases can be identified accurately. Specifically, the model trained
based on the Nexus 6P device with T-Mobile’s Wi-Fi calling service can be applied to the other devices and
carriers (e.g., Samsung Galaxy J7, S6, S7, S8, Apple iPhone6, iPhone7, and iPhone8 with AT&T or/and Verizon).
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Test Device T-Mobile AT&T Verizon
Samsung J7 (Verizon) N/A N/A 100%
Samsung S6 (AT&T) N/A 100% N/A
Samsung S7 (T-Mobile) 100% N/A N/A
Samsung S8 (AT&T) N/A 100% N/A
Nexus 6P 100% N/A N/A
iPhone 6 100% 100% 100%
iPhone 7 100% 100% 100%
iPhone 8 100% 100% 100%
Table 2. Classification accuracy of Wi-Fi calling events in various cross-phone/cross-carrier cases. N/A means that the test
phone does not support the carrier’s Wi-Fi calling service.
3.1.2 Rationale and security implications. It is not without reasons that the Wi-Fi calling standards consider
only the quality of Wi-Fi links and Internet connectivity for the selection of Wi-Fi networks, since Wi-Fi calling
sessions have been protected by IPSec with end-to-end confidentiality and integrity protection. Though it is
unlikely for an adversary to decrypt/alter the Wi-Fi calling packets, intercepting those packets for the further
attacks are still possible. We believe that 3GPP and GSMA shall revisit current Wi-Fi network selection mechanism
for the Wi-Fi calling service in terms of security and make further revisions to address the issues. Otherwise, the
Wi-Fi calling users are being exposed to potential security threats.
3.2 Q2: Do any security mechanisms exist on the devices or/and the network infrastructure to
defend against possible security threats?
The answer is yes. There exists a system-switch mechanism in which when a Wi-Fi calling device cannot be
reached through its connected Wi-Fi network (e.g., the Wi-Fi calling signaling packets cannot be delivered to
users successfully), it would switch back to the cellular network and use the cellular-based voice service (e.g.,
VoLTE (Voice over LTE)). This mechanism can protect the Wi-Fi calling device from the DoS attack where the
Wi-Fi calling packets are discarded, because the attack impact will be considered as the case that the device is
unreachable. However, they do not completely eliminate the security threats. It does not work for some attack
cases, e.g., packets are dropped during an ongoing Wi-Fi calling service. The vulnerability we discovered is as
follows.
Vulnerability 4 (V4). This is a design defect in the Wi-Fi calling standards. The Wi-Fi calling standards and
cellular network standards [3–5] indeed stipulate the procedures which provide users with the seamless service
continuity across the Wi-Fi calling and the cellular-based voice services. However, the initiation of the procedures
only considers the quality of Wi-Fi links (Vulnerability 4 (V4)). That is, once the link quality is good, the Wi-Fi
calling device will not switch from the Wi-Fi calling service to the cellular-based voice even if all the Wi-Fi calling
packets keep being dropped. As a result, an adversary is able to get Wi-Fi calling users stuck in malicious Wi-Fi
networks and cause them to suffer from poor voice services.
3.2.1 Validation. We conduct experiments to validate V4 by examining the behaviors of the service continuity
mechanism during DoS attacks. We discard a device’s packets during two different times of its Wi-Fi calling call:
(1) the time that a call is being dialed, and (2) the time that a call is ongoing. Note that in our experiments, the
Wi-Fi signal strengths at the Wi-Fi calling devices are strong.
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Fig. 5. A trace shows that a Wi-Fi calling phone initiates a VoLTE call under the DoS attack which is launched during the
time that a call is being dialed..
In the first case, the device keeps sending SIP INVITE packets to the Wi-Fi calling server and waiting for the
response (i.e., SIP 100 Trying). Since the packets are dropped, it does not receive any response to SIP INVITE.
After six attempts, it switches back to the cellular-based voice service by initiating a VoLTE outgoing call. In 10
runs, all the calls are switched to VoLTE successfully, as shown in Figure 5. It is a low-level cellular network trace
that shows the switch back to the VoLTE call. Note that it is obtained on our test phone via the MobileInsight [56]
tool, which is a tool collecting cellular network protocol traces.
In the second case, Wi-Fi calling voice calls are interrupted within 8-10 seconds after the packets drop starts,
but do not switch back to VoLTE calls. It shows that the service continuity mechanism does not support ongoing
Wi-Fi calling calls while Wi-Fi signals are strong.
3.2.2 Rationale and security implications. Seemingly, it is an operational slip of operators, since cellular network
standards have stipulated how to keep service continuity across different radio access technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi
and LTE). There are two proposed methods: SRVCC (Single Radio Voice Call Continuity) [3] and DRVCC (Dual
Radio Voice Call Continuity) [4, 5]. However, after a second thought, it might not be the case. The SRVCC/DRVCC
procedure is initiated by the network infrastructure and triggered based on the radio quality conditions of current
serving base station (BS) and neighboring BSes. It implies that the SRVCC/DRVCC will be never triggered if the
radio quality of the current serving BS is good. This design makes sense in the traditional cellular network, but
does not work for Wi-Fi calling services, whose traffic has to traverse the Internet, since the procedure may be
needed for security issues regardless of radio quality. It allows an adversary to launch the man-in-the-middle
attacks.As a result, the design of service continuity should consider not only radio quality but also service quality
due to the security concern.
4 USER PRIVACY LEAKAGE ATTACK
In this section, we devise a proof-of-concept attack that can leak the privacy of Wi-Fi calling users. We exploit
the discovered vulnerabilities to collect call statistics (e.g., call duration, number of dialing calls, etc.) for each
device or IP; in the meantime, cameras are used to identify nearby persons’ behaviors related to phone usages. By
considering two information sources together, a device’s call statistics can be associated with a person’s behaviors,
e.g., a device with 5-second call duration and a person who holds his/her phone and speaks for 5 seconds. Based
on such associations, the adversary can know the IP address of a specific Wi-Fi calling user, and further be able
to inspect his/her packets. The packet inspection allows the adversary to infer user privacy including device
activities (e.g., accessing gmail), device information (e.g., iPhone 7), and running applications (e.g., WeChat),
etc. In addition, several prior arts have demonstrated that the call statistics can be exploited to infer other user
privacy information including mood (e.g., stressful [54]), personality (e.g., conscientiousness [27]), malicious
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Fig. 6. A Wi-Fi calling-based user privacy inference system (UPIS).
Protocol  | Length    | Info
HTTP             497           GET   /.a/2.42.0/js/cnn-header-second.min.js HTTP/1.1
HTTP             493           GET   /.a/2.42.0/js/cnn-analytics.min.js HTTP/1.1
HTTP             497           GET   /.a/2.42.0/js/cnn-footer-lib.min.js HTTP/1.1
Host: www.i.cdn.cnn.com
Cookie: countryCode=US; geoData=east lansing|MI|48824|US|NA
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_1 like Mac OS X)
Version/11.0 Mobile/15B5078e Safari
(a) Phone model: iPhone OS 11.1
Protocol|Length| Info
HTTP          830     POST /mmtls/305ed448 HTTP/1.1 (application/octet-stream)
HTTP          364     HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/octet-stream)
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Host: minorshort.weixin.qq.com
Upgrade: mmtls
User-Agent: MicroMessenger Client
(b) Application: WeChat
Fig. 7. UPIS infers phone models and running applications for a specific Wi-Fi calling user.
behaviors (e.g., dialing spamming calls) [12], to name a few. As a result, this attack can cause Wi-Fi calling users
to leak the call statistics-based and IP-based user privacy.
We develop a Wi-Fi calling-based user privacy inference system (UPIS) to launch this attack. Its system
architecture is shown in Figure 6. It consists of three major components: WiCA (Wi-Fi Calling Analyzer), UCIA
(User Call and ID Analyzer), and CS-IP2U (call statistics based IP-to-User correlation) modules. WiCA intercepts
all the Wi-Fi packets and classifies them based on whether they belong to the Wi-Fi calling service. For the Wi-Fi
calling packets, WiCA extracts call statistics for each device IP, which includes (1) who initiates a call, (2) who
hangs up first, (3) ringing time, and (4) call conversation time. The others are dispatched to real-time traffic
analyzers, which extract and collect application identification, device information, and DNS query information,
etc., as shown in Figure 7. UCIA identifies users and extracts their call statistics based on face recognition and
human motion detection techniques. CS-IP2U relies on the call statistics from WiCA and UCIA to associate each
user with an IP address. It generates a mapping table with IPs and users, as well as each user’s call statistics.
We next elaborate on the WiCA, UCIA, and CS-IP2U components, and finally evaluate the UPIS system.
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Fig. 9. The IPSec packets observed for the callee of a call. (×: uplink packets; ■: downlink packets).
4.1 WiCA (Wi-Fi Calling Analyzer)
WiCA infers call statistics per IP basis by analyzing Wi-Fi calling traffic. As shown in Figure 8, its operation
includes two working phases: (1) phase I, event classification and (2) Phase II, call statistics extraction. Before
entering these two phases, WiCA conducts a quick analysis on the intercepted Wi-Fi packets. It identifies whether
they belong to the Wi-Fi calling service by checking whether they are IPSec packets sent to/from Wi-Fi calling
operators’ gateways. If yes, WiCA enters those two-phase operation; otherwise, they are dispatched to other
IP-based privacy analyzers. We next introduce each working phase.
4.1.1 Phase I: Event Classification. We identify call events based on traffic characteristics ofWi-Fi calling signaling
and voice packets. We illustrate them using an example that a user receives an incoming Wi-Fi calling call,
answers it within 6 seconds after a ring tone, and then starts a 12-second voice conversation. Figure 9 shows
the IPSec packets observed on the Wi-Fi AP with which the user or the callee associates. Four events can be
observed: (1) receiving a call with a ring tone; (2) answering a call; (3) talking; (4) hanging up a call.
ACM Trans. Priv. Sec., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: November 2018.
12 • T. Xie et al.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5
(2.00s)
Receive
(2.43s)
Ringing
SIP Invite
starts
Pa
ck
et
 S
ize
 (b
yte
)
Time (second)
(a) Downlink (sent by server)
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5
(2.43s)
Send
SIP Ringing
Ringing
starts
Pa
ck
et
 S
ize
 (b
yte
)
Time (second)
(b) Uplink (sent by callee)
Fig. 10. Packet arrivals for the event ‘receiving a call with a
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Fig. 11. Packet arrivals for ‘answering a call’.
Event 1: Receiving a call with a ringtone. Figures 10(a) and 10(b) respectively show downlink and uplink packets
between the Wi-Fi calling server and the callee for this event. At the 2nd second, a 1360-byte IPSec packet is
received by the callee. After decrypting it at the callee side, it is an SIP INVITE message, which indicates that a
call is coming. At the 2.43th second, the callee sends an SIP 180 RINGING message to the Wi-Fi calling server
(Figure 10(b)). Afterwards, it is observed that several small IPSec packets with only 176 bytes are received by
the callee, but the callee does not send any packets back. We discover that they are voice packets over the RTP
(Real-Time Protocol) protocol.
Event 2: Answering a call As shown in Figures 11(a) and 11(b), the callee answers the call at the 8.38th second
by sending an SIP 200 OK message to the server, and then receives an acknowledgment at the 8.68th second.
Afterwards, the call conversation starts and the callee begins to send/receive voice packets.
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Fig. 13. Packet arrivals for ‘hanging up a call’.
Event 3: Talking The observed traffic for this event is shown in Figure 12. During the call conversation, the
callee keeps sending/receiving voice packets to/from the Wi-Fi calling server, and no SIP message is observed.
We further discover that the callee at least receives 10 voice packets every two seconds from the server.
Event 4: Hanging up a call The callee sends a BYE message at the 20.19th second when hanging up the call, as
shown in Figure 13(b). After the 20.32nd second, no more IPSec packets are observed. Note that when the BYE is
sent by the server, it means that the caller hangs up first.
Traffic Pattern Analysis.We have five observations on the traffic characteristics of Wi-Fi calling voice calls.
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(1) The sizes of IPSec packets carrying voice are smaller than 200 bytes (e.g., 176 bytes).
(2) The sizes of IPSec packets, which carry critical Wi-Fi calling signaling messages (i.e., INVITE, 180 RINGING,
200 OK, BYE), are much larger than voice packets (e.g., 800-1360 bytes).
(3) The callee receives voice packets from the Wi-Fi calling server after the 180 RINGING message is sent.
(4) No voice packets are sent out by the callee before the call conversation starts.
(5) The callee keeps receiving more than 10 voice packets every two seconds from the Wi-Fi calling server
after the call conversation starts.
Based on the analysis results, WiCA can identify whether an outgoing call is initiated, an incoming call arrives
or a call ends, and further classify the IPSec packets into the Call events and Not call events categories.
Note that these five observations except the third one are confirmed to be available for all our test operators. The
third observation is only applicable to T-Mobile and AT&T.
4.1.2 Phase II: Call Statistics Extraction. In Phase II, WiCA seeks to extract call statistics from IPSec packets.
Figure 14 illustrates its finite state machine, where the initial state is IDLE. It works as follows.
IDLE
state
RUNNING
state
First IPSec packet arrives
Not-In-Talking is detected
Fig. 14. State transition diagram of WiCA.
Step 1. At the initial IDLE state, when any IPSec packet is received, the system starts to do event extraction
by moving to the RUNNING state. The system checks whether the IPSec packet belongs to a call event based on
whether it is sent to/from the Wi-Fi calling server. If yes, the event, ‘dialing a call’ or ‘receiving a call’, is classified
based on its forwarding direction. In the former, the IPSec packet is sent from the UE; otherwise, it is sent to the
UE.
Step 2. At the RUNNING state, WiCA uses a 2-second time window to group the collected IPSec packets and
classifies them by the following three categories: C-Large, C-Middle, and C-Small. They represent the packets
with the sizes larger than 800 bytes, between 200 and 800 bytes, and smaller than 200 bytes, respectively. The
C-Large includes some critical SIP call messages (e.g., INVITE, RINGING, etc.), whereas the C-Small has voice
packets. Note that the 2-second packet collection is denoted as Data2sec (x), where x is the sequence of a series of
the 2-sec collection sets.
Step 3.WiCA can identify three scenarios, Ringing, Talking and Not in Talking, based on the number of uplink
and downlink C-Small packets in Data2sec (x), which are denoted as Num_UL_CSmall and Num_DL_CSmall
respectively. The rules are summarized in Table 3. When no scenario is identified, Data2sec (x) is buffered and the
system moves back to Step 2. When one of these three scenarios is identified in the Data2sec (x) collection, the
subsequent actions are taken in the following.
• Ringing: the system revisits the last collection, Data2sec (x − 1), and looks for the time that the last C-Large
IPSec packet is captured. This times is considered as the time that the ring starts, TRinдinдStar t .
• Talking:when no Talking scenarios are identified before this, the system revisits the collectionData2sec (x−1)
and finds the time that the first C-Large IPSec packet (i.e., SIP 200 OK, which indicates the event of
answering the call) is captured. This time is considered as the time that the talk starts, TTalkinдStar t .
• Not In Talking: the system revisits the collection, Data2sec (x − 1), to discover the time that the first C-Large
IPSec packet (i.e., SIP BYE) is captured. This time is considered as the time of the call end, TCallEnd .
Moreover, if this C-Large packet is sent by the UE, it means that the UE side hangs up first. Otherwise, it
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Conditions Identified Scenarios
Num_UL_CSmall Num_DL_CSmall
=0 >10 Ringinga
>10 >10 Talking
=0 =0 Not in Talking
Table 3. Num_UL_CSmall and Num_DL_CSmall , which respectively represent numbers of uplink and downlink packets
smaller than 200 bytes within 2 seconds, are used to determine Ringing, Talking, Not in Talking scenarios for Verizon, T-Mobile
and AT&T.
aOnly applicable to AT&T and T-Mobile but not Verizon, which does not send small voice packets to the Wi-Fi calling callee when his/her
phone is ringing.
indicates that the other side hangs up first. When the call end is observed in the Not in Talking event, the
pattern analyzer outputs who initiates the call, ringing time duration (i.e., TTalkinдStar t −TRinдinдStar t or
TCallEnd −TRinдinдStar t ), conversation time duration (i.e., TCallStop -TTalkinдStar t ), and who hangs up first.
The system then returns to the IDLE state. Note that the conversation duration estimation is not applicable
to the calls where Wi-Fi calling users do not answer them or hang up them before the conversations start.
4.1.3 Implementation. We implement WiCA using Python3 on a 2014 Macbook Pro laptop (CPU:Intel I5-4278U,
RAM: 8GB). It consists of two modules: event classification and call statistics extraction.
Event Classification.WiCA intercepts all the Wi-Fi packets using ARP spoofing and then filters out packets
with operators’ IP addresses (e.g., those of T-Mobile, AT&T, and Verizon) and with the IPSec type. According to the
above analysis, these packets belong to the Wi-Fi calling service. WiCA buffers them into memory and classifies
them into six Wi-Fi calling events based on the identified traffic patterns (i.e., packet direction, interval, packet
size, etc.). We develop this classifier based on the scikit-learn library [1]. The packets together with corresponding
events are then delivered to the call statistics extraction module.
Call Statistics Extraction. We develop a call statistics extraction module in Python3 to extract the call
statistics from the packets sent by the Event Classification module. The extraction is carried out based on the
traffic pattern analysis in Section 4.1.2 and Wi-Fi calling packet characteristics specified in Table 3. It can identify
who initiates a call, who hangs up a call first, and the time that Ringing/Talking starts/stops.
4.1.4 Evaluation. We next evaluate the WiCA’s performance with three top-tier U.S. operators, Verizon, AT&T,
and T-Mobile. On each test phone, we dial 50 outgoing calls and receive 50 incoming calls using the Wi-Fi calling
service. Meanwhile, we collect call-related traces on the phone during the experiments. Note that we collect
the traces via a command, logcat -b radio -v threadtime | grep "update phone state", on Android
phones.
We next compare the events identified by the WiCA and those extracted from the collected traces. The results
show that WiCA can correctly identify (1) who initiates the call and (2) who hangs up first in all the experiments.
For the ringing and conversation time, we compare the difference between the time estimated by the WiCA and
that observed on the test phones. Table 4 summarizes the mean and standard deviation results of estimation
errors. It is observed that all the errors are smaller than 0.8s in the experiments. Note that we are currently not
able to determine the ringing time for Verizon since its network does not send small voice packets to the Wi-Fi
calling callee after his/her phone rings.
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Time T-Mobile AT&T VerizonMean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Ringing 0.16s 0.11s 0.34s 0.11s N/A N/A a
Conversation 0.17s 0.07s 0.67s 0.13s 0.44s 0.2s
Table 4. Errors of ringing and conversation time estimation.
aVerizon does not send small voice packets to the Wi-Fi calling callee when his/her phone is ringing.
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Fig. 15. A working flowchart of the UCIA. The red bounding box denotes a detected user calling/talking motion, whereas the
yellow bounding box denotes a detected user face.
4.2 UCIA (User Call and ID Analyzer)
UCIA is a visual recognition system which identifies users and user motions related to making calls (e.g., a user
moves a phone to his/her ears). It leverages multiple computer vision technologies including a face detector
designed for finding small faces in a video, called tiny face detector, DR-GAN (Disentangled Representation
learning-Generative Adversarial Network), HOG (Histogram of Oriented Gradient), and SVM (Support Vector
Machine). It can precisely output user identities and specific calling motions. Note that UCIA does not require
users to still or a high-resolution video. It can support the video that contains the face resolutions higher than or
equal to 25x10 [34].
Figure 15 illustrates the working flow chart of the UCIA, which analyzes videos on a per-frame basis. It consists
of two modules: (1) calling/talking motion detection and (2) user face detection and recognition. In each video
frame, it uses the HOG and SVM models to detect calling/talking motions for all users, and labels those whose
motions are detected using red bounding boxes. For each red bounding box, it furthers uses the tiny face detector
and DR-GAN model to label the user face with a yellow bounding box, and identifies his/her identities (i.e.,
names). We next detail these two modules and evaluate the UCIA’s performance.
4.2.1 Calling/talking Motion Detection. This module recognizes calling/talking motions using SVM and HOG
techniques.
SVM. We train an SVM model to recognize whether a person is dialing a call or talking in a call. Since no
video sets contain those two actions, we invite a number of volunteers to record videos of their dialing/talking
motions. To enable the model to differentiate those two actions from the others, we do the training by mixing
those recorded videos with the UCF101 database [51] that has 13320 videos from 101 action categories.
HOG. It has been a very famous detection algorithm since 2005 [26]. An HOG descriptor is obtained by
computing the statistic information of histograms of oriented gradient for the local areas of an image. Its
applications have been widely used in object recognition, especially gaining a great success in the pedestrian
detection. Specifically, object appearances and shapes in an image can be well-represented by the density and
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Fig. 16. The working flowchart of the tiny face detector.
orientation of the gradient or edge. To implement the HOG descriptor, we first divide the image into different
small connected components, called cells, and then collect the orientation histogram of gradients for each pixel
within each cell. Finally, we concatenate all the histograms to get the final HOG descriptor.
The HOG descriptor [26] is used as the feature representation of persons. Each frame in a surveillance video
generates a lot of candidate bounding boxes by a sliding window. After all the persons are marked by the bounding
boxes, the pre-trained SVM classifier determines whether a dialing action happens in each bounding box based
on the change of edge information (i.e., gradient information). As a result, the HOG descriptor is a reasonable
choice to work with the SVM model to recognize the dialing/talking actions.
4.2.2 User Face Detection and Recognition. We deploy a face recognition model to detect and recognize the
person face. It is based on the technique of deep convolution neural network (CNN), which is getting more and
more popular with its high accuracy and efficiency in handling most vision problems. Since not all of surveillance
cameras offer high video quality (e.g., 1080p), we adopt a tiny face detector [34], which is designed to detect small
faces (e.g., a face with the size of 3 ∗ 3cm2) in a low-resolution video. Note that the tiny face detector can also
support large faces in a high-resolution video. Moreover, since people do not always face to the camera in a frontal
view, extracting pose-invariant feature representations is critical to improve the face recognition performance.
DR-GAN [55] can generate those representations and then recognize user identities. We next introduce the tiny
face detector and the DR-GAN.
Tiny face detector. The working flowchart of this detector is illustrated in Figure 16. We first resize each input
image into two different resolution images to construct an image pyramid for the training. Those images with
different scales/resolutions are inputted into a CNNmodel to update shared variables. Based on this trained model,
we are able to predict the bounding boxes on this image pyramid. Incorporating non-maximum suppression
(NMS) method [43] selects and merges all detected bounding boxes to conduct the final detection on the original
size of the input image. Note that since a well-trained model has been provided by Hu et al. [34], we adopt it
instead of re-training our own model here.
DR-GAN-based face recognition.We employ DR-GAN to recognize user identities, but it is challenging to
deal with variations on the faces (e.g., illumination conditions, pose and expression changes). Especially, the
pose changes can cause a big drop on face recognition performance. To tackle this challenge, our approach is as
follows.
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Fig. 17. Overview of DR-GAN architecture.
First, we define face angles that range from -90°to 90°. If the face angle equals to 0°, the face is frontal view,
which almost contains all facial information that is positive for recognition. If it is -90°or 90°, only one side of face
is visible and it is difficult for the model to recognize the face based on a profile. Second, we leverage DR-GAN
that can train a network to extract disentangled face representation by fine-tuning on the GAN (Generative
Adversarial Networks). It can generate a representation for each face with personal identity information and
then the representation can be used for face verification and identification.
The DR-GAN face recognition flowchart is shown in Figure 17. To train a DR-GAN model, several face images
of the same identity with different poses are used as the input. Each image will be fed into the encoder, which
uses VGG16 as the network structure. Except for generating a 320-dim feature f , the encoder also outputs a
1-dim coefficientw for each face. We then compute the fused feature f ′ by the following equation:
f ′ =
∑n
i wi fi∑n
i wi
, (1)
where f ′ is a weighed average over all the fi . We next feed f ′ into a decoder to generate an output image with
same size as the input, which is called synthetic image. Note that when feeding f ′ into the decoder, a pose code c
and a random noise z are appended. c can help decoder to generate a synthetic image with arbitrary pose and z can
prevent decoder from the issue of over-fitting. Finally, we combine the original input faces with the synthetic image
and take them to train a discriminator. When the adversarial training between encoder/decoder and discriminator
has converged, we can get an updated encoder. This well-trained encoder is capable of generating the disentangled
feature representations for all the input images and we can take those features for face recognition.
4.2.3 Implementation. We next introduce the implementation of dialing/talking motion detection and user face
detection/recognition modules.
Dialing/talking Motion Detection. We train a binary SVM model for the dialing/talking motion detection.
For each training video, assume that the person bounding box for each frame is known and an HOG descriptor
can be extracted for the corresponding bounding box. This applies to both cases of positive and negative
videos. The extracted positive and negative HOG descriptors would be the training data for the SVM. In current
implementation, we use VLFeat [57] to extract HOG descriptors and train the binary SVM.
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Fig. 18. Six users participated in the UCIA performance evaluation experiment.
User Face Detection and Recognition.We adopt MatConvNet and Tensorflow as the deep learning libraries
for the tiny face detector and DR-GAN modules. First, we develop the tiny face detector and DR-GAN which
detect and align the faces for each frame in the testing videos on top of our campus computing servers (MSU
HPCC). After that, we feed all the aligned faces into the encoder of the DR-GAN to get the 320-dim features.
Besides, we select an aligned frontal face for each person in the testing videos as the gallery image. When
conducting the face recognition results, the cosine distance between the feature vector of a detected face in the
testing videos and the one from gallery images is computed. If a gallery face has the closest distance with this
detected face, the label of this gallery face will be assigned to the detected face.
4.2.4 Evaluation. We next evaluate the UCIA system.
Training data collection.We recruit 20 volunteers and collect their face images with distinct angles 2 as well
as their dialing/talking actions. These videos are positive training data samples. We use UCF101 database [51] as
the negative training samples because they do not contain dialing/talking actions. Moreover, for the detection
support of multiple Wi-Fi calling users, we collect videos containing at most 4 different people with different
actions over time.
Performance evaluation.We evaluate the UCIA system using three performance metrics: (1) motion detection
accuracy (MCA), which is computed by Equation 2; (2) call statistic errors, i.e., time difference between the actual
time that a call starts/ends and the estimated time that a call stops/ends; and (3) identity recognition accuracy
(IRA), which is computed by Equation 3.
MCA =
NumCML
TtlNumMF
, (2)
where NumCML is the number of correct motion labels, which are those predicted correctly, and TtlNumMF is
the total number of motion frames.
IRA =
NumCL
TtlNumF
, (3)
where NumCL is the total number of frames with correct labels and TtlNumF represents the number of total
frames.
In our experiments, three test scenarios are considered: (1) one person, (2) two persons, and (3) four persons
are in the test videos. We use the cross-validation method to evaluate the UCIA performance. We randomly select
six participants from our 20 volunteers who contribute training data. They are denoted ID1, ID2, ID3, ID4, ID5,
and ID6 as shown in Figure 18.
• Single user. In this experiment, there is only one person recorded in the video. We only ask the participant
to dial at least one call. During the experiment, he/she is allowed to make any random actions (e.g., looking
at the ground). Note that to simulate the real use scenario, we do not restrict the time period of each Wi-Fi
2Note that all the volunteers’ faces are visible.
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ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 ID5 ID6
(a) (b)
Fig. 19. Detection and recognition sample results for two people (ID1 (right) and ID5 (left)). The red bounding boxes mark
the persons who are making the call. The yellow bounding boxes mark the detection/recognition of the face/identity.
Performance Matrix ID1 ID5Mean Std Mean Std
MDA (Motion Detection Accuracy) 93.33% 2.38% 86.66% 6.67%
IRA (Identity Recognition Accuracy) 85.87% 3.33% 85.21% 2.66%
Call conversation time error (sec) 1.78 0.045 1.65 0.18
Call start time error (sec) 0.708 0.020 1.26 0.077
Call end time error (sec) 1.21 0.029 0.58 0.102
Table 5. The performance of the UCIA on the 2-user group with ID1 and ID5.
calling call (i.e., it varies with different participants). For each participant, we take five videos; each video
lasts 15 to 25 seconds. We use the UICA system to analyze these new videos and the videos recorded from
20 participants. When a user picks up his phone and puts it close to his ear in the video, the UCIA is able to
detect this action and mark this person using a red bounding box to denote that this person is making a
phone call. Meanwhile, the tiny face detector can detect the face and use the small yellow bounding boxes
to mark the face detection results. The DR-GAN assigns an ID label to each detected face (the number
shown on the upper-left corner of the bounding box). The results show that the UCIA can achieve average
accuracy 92.5% and 96.5% for motion detection (MCA) and face recognition (IRA), respectively. The call
statistic errors are less than 1.5 seconds (i.e., time difference between the estimated time from the UCIA
module and the time observed from the actual phone call.). Note that the MCA, the IRA, and the call statistic
errors may vary with the sporadic uncontrolled motions of the participants (e.g., they may not always look
at the surveillance camera).
• Two users. This experiment includes two participants in the test video. Each user is asked to dial at least
one call. They can also do any actions during the experiment. For each two-user group, we conduct 10
experiment runs and record 10 videos. Figure 19 is the snapshots of one of the experiments; there are two
users with ID1 and ID5 who walk around or/and make a phone call. Figure 19(a) and (b) respectively show
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Fig. 20. One captured frame of the video in a four-user experiment with users ID6, ID2, ID4, and ID5 (from left to right).
Performance Matrix ID6 ID2 ID4 ID5Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
MDA (Motion Detection Accuracy) 95% 0.707% 90% 2.89% 90% 1.83% 85% 1.68%
IRA (Identity Recognition Accuracy) 95.64% 2.23% 98.09% 1.01% 92.46% 3.33% 87.05% 4.16%
Call conversation time error (sec) 1.74 0.017 2.12 0.066 1.84 0.039 2.09 0.042
Call start time error (sec) 0.93 0.008 1.35 0.023 1.01 0.021 0.95 0.019
Call end time error (sec) 0.81 0.009 0.77 0.043 0.83 0.018 1.14 0.023
Table 6. The performance of UCIA on the 4-user group with users ID2, ID4, ID5, and ID6.
the actions that user ID5 and user ID1 are making phone calls. The mean and standard deviation of the
MDA, the IRA, and the call statistic errors are given in Table 5. We have three observations. First, the user
ID1 has higher average MDA but lower standard deviation, compared with the user ID5. It may be caused
by the user ID5’s face outline, which is more blurred. Second, the average MDA and IRA are higher than
85% for both users ID1 and ID5. Note that our accuracy considers all video frames. In practice, we do not
require all frames to be recognized accurately. For example, we can still identify a Wi-Fi user even only one
of the frames in the test video is recognized. Third, call start/end time errors for both ID1 and ID5 are less
than 1.3 seconds, whereas the call conversation time error is around 1.8 seconds. In all of our experiments,
the minimum MDA and IRA are higher than 80% and the maximum call statistic errors are less than 2
seconds.
• Four users.We here consider four participants in the experiment, which include users ID2, ID4, ID5, and
ID6, as shown in Figure 20. The experimental settings are the same as the above ones. The mean and
standard deviation of the MDA, the IRA, and the call statistic errors are given in Table 6. There are two
findings. First, the MDA and the IRA for users ID2, ID4, and ID6 are higher than 90%, but user ID5 still
has relatively low MDA and IRA (i.e., 86.66% and 85.21%). The call start/end time errors are less than 1.4
seconds, whereas the call conversation time errors are about 2.2 seconds. The results are comparable to
those in the 2-user experiment. Second, the performance of UCIA does not downgrade significantly when
the number of Wi-Fi calling users doubles.
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Summary: Our UCIA system can achieve the average accuracy of 80% 98.5% for both the MDA and the IRA,
and the average call statistic errors below 2.2 seconds, when the number of users varies from one to four. We
believe that the current performance has been sufficient for the UCIA to identify users and generate useful call
statistics, due to two reasons. First, in practice, it is not required to correctly recognize motions and faces in
all video frames. The UCIA is still able to identify a Wi-Fi user even when only one frame of the test video is
accurately recognized. Second, the call statistic errors do not increase with the call lengths, but depend on the
accuracy of the motion detection (i.e., moving the phone to ears or putting the phone down). According to a
Statista report [24], the average mobile call length in the U.S. is about 108 seconds. So, the average error takes
only a small portion of the average call length, 2.1% (2.2s/108s).
4.3 CS-IP2U (Call Statistic-based IP2User Correlation)
The CS-IP2U correlates user identities with IP addresses based on call statistics extracted by the WiCA and the
UCIA. It mainly considers two kinds of events which are call start and call end. We denote the happening time
of these two events as TCStart and TCEnd , respectively. Ideally, for an identified Wi-Fi calling call, the WiCA
outputs TCStartw , TCEndw , and IP , whereas the UCIA outputs TCStartu , TCEndu , andUserID. One correlation
is identified when TCStartw == TCStartu and TCEndw == TCEndu . Nevertheless, in practice, it is not the case
due to the call statistic errors. The CS-IP2U thus considers not only time points but also time intervals. It works
as follows.
Step 1.We consider a time interval TCStartIntw between TCStartw − σ and TCStartw + σ and another time
interval TCEndIntw between TCEndw − σ and TCEndw + σ for call start and end events, respectively. σ is the
maximum call statistic error observed in the WiCA (i.e., 1 second).
Step 2. A time interval TCStartIntu between TCStartu − ϵ and TCStartw + σ and another time interval
TCEndIntw between TCEndw − ϵ and TCEndw + ϵ are considered for call start and end events, respectively. ϵ is
the maximum call statistic error observed in the UCIA (i.e., 1.5 seconds).
Step 3.We verify two conditions: TCStartIntw
⋂
TCStartIntu , ∅ and TCEndIntw ⋂TCEndIntu , ∅. If both
of them are true, the corresponding IP andUserID are correlated.
Note that the current implementation of the CS-IP2U does not support the cases that multiple Wi-Fi calling
users start or end calls near-simultaneously (within the time interval ofMax{σ , ϵ} (i.e., 1.5 seconds). To address
this issue, more fine-grained call statistic information should be extracted by the WiCA and the UCIA. For
example, we can infer time periods that users are talking and those that user are listening by analyzing uplink
and downlink Wi-Fi calling voice packets at the WiCA and detecting who are talking [23] at the UCIA. We do
not implement this advanced feature on the prototype of our proof-of-concept attack, but only demonstrate the
feasibility of the correlation between user identities and IP addresses.
4.4 Evaluation on the UPIS System
We evaluate the performance of the UPIS system, which integrates the WiCA, the UCIA, and the CS-IP2U. The
CS-IP2U requires to associate time and events between the WiCA and the surveillance camera, so the clock
synchronization between them is needed. In our implementation, they are deployed at the same laptop; otherwise,
the precision time protocol (PTP) [36] can be used for the synchronization. We here repeat the 2-user and 4-user
experiments as conducted in Section 4.2, and collect and analyze the Wi-Fi calling packets at the WiCA. In all the
experiments, the users are allowed to dial more than one calls and do any random actions. We have 5 runs for
each experiment and each participant dials 10-20 calls.
We gauge the average errors of the call start/end times estimated by the WiCA/UCIA by comparing them with
the actual ones, and the success rate of identifying the association between user identities and the IP addresses.
The success rate is the ratio of the number of successful identification times to the total number of Wi-Fi calling
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Performance Matrix Two Users Four UsersID1 ID5 ID6 ID2 ID4 ID5
WiCA start time error (sec) 0.11 0.08 0.25 0.55 0.15 0.08
WiCA end time error (sec) 0.09 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.37 0.10
UCIA start time error (sec) 0.91 1.21 1.51 1.34 0.53 0.98
UCIA end time error (sec) 0.69 0.83 0.62 0.99 0.76 1.19
Success rate of identifying User ID and IP 100% (15/15) 100% (17/17) 95% (19/20) 100% (19/19) 100% (17/17) 95% (19/20)
Table 7. Overall performance of the UPIS system.
calls for each user. The evaluation results are given in Table 7. We have two observations. First, the average
errors of the call start/end times are smaller than 1.52 seconds, which are similar to the evaluation results of
individual WiCA and UCIA modules. Second, there is a very small percentage that the CS-IP2U module does not
successfully identify the identity/IP association (i.e., 97.4%, 74/76). For example, it fails to identify the identity/IP
associations for ID5 and ID6 in a 4-user experiment. The root cause is that these two users dial and end their
calls within a small 1.5-second interval. This issue calls for more fine-grained call statistic information which we
discussed in Section 4.3.
4.5 Real-world Impact
To the best of our knowledge, the UPIS is the first system which can identify IP addresses, call statistics, and the
identities of the Wi-Fi calling users. We believe that some use scenarios can benefit from the UPIS in practice. For
example, in order to be against possible campus assaults, universities can use it to infer students’ personality (e.g.,
conscientiousness [27]), recent mood (e.g., stressful [54]), malicious behaviors (e.g., dialing spamming calls) [12],
or the network services and websites they surf.The UPIS can be also deployed at airports to be against terrorists.
It allows the law enforcement agents to identify suspects’ phone models and IP addresses, and further remotely
install the malware on their phones for monitoring. The remote installation can be achieved by exploiting public
security vulnerabilities of the target devices. Note that we do not advocate any use scenarios compromising user
privacy no matter whether their purposes are benign or not.
5 TELEPHONY HARASSMENT/DENIAL OF VOICE SERVICE (THDOS) ATTACK
We next devise an attack that causes telephony harassment or denial of voice service on Wi-Fi calling users. It can
bypass the security defenses deployed on Wi-Fi calling devices and the infrastructure. It manipulates the delivery
of the Wi-Fi calling signaling and voice packets, and has several variances, e.g., hiding the callee’s alerting, extra
incoming calls, mute calls, etc. In the following, we present attack designs and real-world negative impacts after
introducing the Wi-Fi calling call flow.
5.1 Wi-Fi calling Call Flow
The signaling of the Wi-Fi calling call relies on the session initiation protocol (SIP). Figure 21 shows an outgoing
call flow of the Wi-Fi calling. To initiate a call, the caller sends an SIP INVITE message, which specifies the
capabilities (e.g., voice codec) of the caller, to the callee. Then, the Wi-Fi calling server at the IMS system replies
an 100 Trying message to indicate that the call setup is in progress. In the meantime, the callee replies a list of
chosen voice codecs in an 183 Session message to the caller. Afterwards, the caller sends a PRACK (Provisional
Acknowledge) message to inform the callee about the selected codec. After the callee’s phone rings, it will send
a 180 Ringing message to the caller and then the caller’s phone rings. Once the callee answers the call, two
ends start to chat after exchanging 200 OK and ACK messages. A BYE message is finally sent from the end who
terminates the call and the other end acknowledges it with a 200 OK message.
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Caller CalleeWi-Fi calling Server
1. INVITE
2. 100 Trying
3. 183 Session
4. PRACK
5. 200 OK
6. 180 Ringing
7. PRACK
8. 200 OK
9. 200 OK
10. ACK
12. BYE
13. 200 OK
11. Voice Packets
Fig. 21. Wi-Fi calling call flow diagram.
5.2 Attack Design
We launch an ARP spoofing attack against a Wi-Fi calling user and then intercept all of the user’s Wi-Fi calling
packets. Based on the identified traffic characteristics of Wi-Fi calling calls in Section 4.1, we are able to identify
specific signaling and voice packets.We discover that there are four attack variances by discarding various Wi-Fi
calling packets with different patterns. Table 8 summarizes the results where we drop different signaling packets
or voice packets of an outgoing call.
Annoying-Incoming-Call Attack. The callee as the victim would receive multiple incoming calls from the
caller. There are two approaches. First, the adversary drops the 183 Session Progress message sent by the
callee, and then the caller’s Wi-Fi calling device would initiate another VoLTE call towards the callee. Second,
the adversary discards the 180 Ringing message sent by the callee, and then it would cause the caller’s Wi-Fi
calling device to get stuck in the dialing screen. The caller does not hear any alerting tone, but the callee’s device
would ring. The caller may thus keep redialling.
Zombie-Call Attack. The caller’s device can be forced to get stuck in the dialing screen, when the adversary
discards the 200 OK message sent by the callee. The message indicates that the call has been answered. So the
caller’s device gets stuck in the dialing screen and keeps hearing the alerting tone. The call conversation is thus
never started.
Mute Call Attack. Two parties of a Wi-Fi calling call are both victims. This attack does not aim to terminate
the call but only mute the victims’ speech. Our result shows that the adversary can mute the call up to 8 seconds
by dropping voice packets. Note that if the voice suspension time is longer than 8 seconds, the voice call will be
terminated by the network.
Telephony Denial-of-Voice-Service Attack. Both the caller and the callee are victims. This attack aims to
downgrade the voice quality of a Wi-Fi calling call so that the conversation is hard to be continued, whereas
the deployed system-switch security mechanism (i.e., switching a Wi-Fi calling call to cellular network voice
call) is suppressed. It is achieved by controlling the drop rate of the intercepted Wi-Fi calling packets of the
victim. Table 9 shows the negative impact on voice quality for different drop rates. There are four findings. First,
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No. Dropped Packets Sender Results
1 INVITE Caller Caller initiates a cellular-based call.
2 100 Trying Server No effect.
3 183 Session Callee Two outgoing calls arrive at callee.
4 PRACK Caller No effect.
5 200 OK Callee No effect.
6 180 Ringing Callee Caller will not enter conservation state. His/herphone gets stuck in the dialing screen.
7 PRACK Caller No effect.
8 200 OK Callee Caller keeps hearing the alerting tone.
9 200 OK Callee Caller keeps hearing the alerting tone.
10 ACK Caller No effect.
11 Voice Packets Caller/Callee Call drops or voice quality downgrades.
12 BYE Caller Callee gets stuck in the conversation state for 20s.Afterwards, the call is terminated.
13 200 OK Callee No effect.
Table 8. The results where we drop different Wi-Fi calling signaling packets or voice packets of an outgoing call.
Drop Rate (%) Voice Quality
below 20% No clear impact.
40-60% Some noises.
70-90% Conversation is hardly continued.
100% Call is terminated by the network.
Table 9. Voice quality varies with the drop rate of voice packets.
when the packet drop rate is below 20%, users do not report voice quality downgrade. Second, when the packet
drop rate is increased to 40%-60%, some of users may notice some noises. Third, when the packet drop rate is
70%-90%, the voice call is hardly continued. Fourth, when the packet drop rate is 100%, the Wi-Fi calling call will
be terminated in less than 10 seconds.
5.3 Real-world Impact
The real-world impact of our THDoS attack can be significant in practice. Most of U.S. universities have deployed
campusWi-Fi networks. However, our studies show that the campusWi-Fi is the best attack surface for adversaries.
Take Michigan State University as an example. Its campus Wi-Fi (MSUNet) provides all students, the faculty,
and the staff with free Wi-Fi access. In our 2-min experiment, we discover that more than 700 devices including
smartphones, tablets, and computers, connect to MSUNet. All the devices are served by the same gateway which
is vulnerable to ARP spoofing attack. Note that we validated the gateway’s vulnerability through our own devices.
As a result, adversaries are likely to intercept the packets of all Wi-Fi calling devices and launch the THDoS
attack. Note that the campus Wi-Fi at Michigan State University is not the only Wi-Fi infrastructure with this
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Running Application(s) a Correctness of Detection
0 100%
1 10%
2 0%
3 0%
Table 10. Detection correctness when applying the previous trained model to the traffic
on the VPN tunnel.
aExcluding the Wi-Fi calling services.
issue. We find that it also exists in many universities’ campus Wi-Fi, such as New York University, University of
California Berkeley, Northeastern University, etc.
6 RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
In this section, we propose not only a short-term solution using virtual private network (VPN), which can mitigate
the threats quickly in practice, but also a long-term solution upgrading Wi-Fi Calling standards, which can
address the security vulnerabilities thoroughly. Though the ARP spoofing detection is a straightforward solution
for the aforementioned threats, the cost is too high to be deployed in large-scale networks. Specifically, for a
public Wi-Fi network, it requires to maintain a database for all the users. We thus skip this solution option in this
section.
6.1 Using VPN Service
Currently, most of the IPSec packets sent between the Wi-Fi calling devices and the ePDG belong to the Wi-Fi
calling services. It allows the adversary to easily identify the Wi-Fi calling events from encrypted IPSec packets.
We suggest that operators can add noise to the transmitted data and then leverage VPN services (e.g., AT&T IPSec
VPN [11] and IPVanish VPN) to carry all the data, which can be from Wi-Fi calling services, other applications,
or/and noise. It can increase the difficulties of the inference on the Wi-Fi calling packets, and it is much more
challenging to develop a general cross-device/cross-user/cross-operator approach for the inference. Note that
Wi-Fi calling users may not need to pay extra cost since some popular VPN services (e.g., NordVPN, TunnelBear
VPN and Golden Frog VyprVPN) [44] provide free versions and many commercial off-the-shelf home Wi-Fi router
manufacturers (e.g., Netgear and TP-Link) support VPN server functions on their Wi-Fi routers.
To confirm the viability of this solution, we set up a VPN channel on our Wi-Fi calling devices and run various
applications simultaneously while using the Wi-Fi calling service. We run three popular applications, Google
Gmail, Tencent Wechat, and Google Maps, in the background. For different combinations of them, we conduct
10 experiments and directly apply the previous trained model to them. Table 10 shows the performance of this
short-term VPN solution. It is observed that when the traffic of the running applications mixes with that of the
Wi-Fi calling, the detection correctness largely downgrades. Though this quick remedy does not completely
eliminate security threats, we believe that it can significantly reduce the real-world damages caused by the Wi-Fi
calling based attacks in a short time.
6.2 Upgrading Wi-Fi Calling Standards
The traffic of the Wi-Fi calling service may traverse public, insecure Wi-Fi networks, so its security shall be at
least one of the top-priority features in the standards. We here propose two mechanisms for the need of the
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standard upgrade. Note that we aim to take security actions against malicious Wi-Fi networks and possible
corresponding attacks, but not secure public/private Wi-Fi networks that are out of the operator’s control.
First, both of the Wi-Fi calling devices and the infrastructure should detect whether Wi-Fi calling users are
suffering from attacks. It can be done based on the Wi-Fi calling service quality. Once detected, the Wi-Fi calling
users should switch their calls to another Wi-Fi networks or the conventional cellular network. It requires
SRVCC/DRVCC to be upgraded to add the service quality to be one new trigger factor of network switches.
Second, both of Wi-Fi calling infrastructure and devices should deploy some security defenses against the
well-known Wi-Fi based attacks. For example, the infrastructure should update the RAN and ANDSF rules to
exclude malicious networks from the root. The Wi-Fi calling devices should deploy security defenses (e.g., ARP
Guard -WiFi security [50]) to detect or defend against several common attacks (e.g., the ARP spoofing attack) to
ensure that the Wi-Fi networks to which they connect are secure, since not all the attacks can be detected by the
infrastructure.
Note that this long-term solution can radically address V1, V2, and V3. Moreover, when those three vulnerabil-
ities are eliminated, V4 does not exist.
7 RELATED WORK
Cellular Network Security. Cellular network security is getting more attention in recent years. Christian et
al. [18] proposed Sonar to detect SS7 redirection attacks with audio-based distance bounding. Reaves et al. [46]
introduced AuthentiCall to protect voice calls made over traditional telephone networks by leveraging now-
common data connections available to call endpoints. Another study [48] analyzed nearly 400,000 text messages
sent to public online SMS gateways over the course of 14 months and offered insights into the prevalence of SMS
spam and behaviors. The other three works[31, 32, 49] study various attacks for SIP on different levels, discuss a
potential attack based on SIP signaling, and classify existing SIP attacks and defenses, respectively. Compared
with them, our work focuses on the security of the newly deployed Wi-Fi calling service security, which has not
been fully explored yet.
VoIP and VoLTE Security. The security problem of the VoIP and VoLTE system has attracted lots of attentions.
Two studies [21, 29] examine side-channel attacks on VoIP traffic. McGann et al. [42] analyzed the security threats
and tools in the VoIP system. Several security issues (e.g., Toll Fraud) of VoIP applications were discussed in [35].
Li et al. [39] examined the security implications of VoLTE, which include several vulnerabilities (e.g., improper
charing policies). Dacosta et al. [25] proposed the use of a modified version of OpenSER to improve authentication
performance of distributed SIP proxies. This paper studies the Wi-Fi calling service from the perspectives of the
standard, the implementation, and the operation, which are not covered by the prior arts.
Side-Channel AttacksAgainstMobile Systems. The side-channel information leakage against mobile systems
has been a popular research area in recent years. Current studies [21, 29] target the side-channel information
leaked by mobile users’ traffic, which is generated by some particular Internet services, and then seek to infer
users’ activities. The work [16] introduces the analysis on automatic fingerprinting of mobile applications for
arbitrarily small samples of Internet traffic. Ali et al. [9] illustrated that each app leaves a fingerprint on its traffic
behavior (e.g., transfer rates, packet exchanges, and data movement). Another work [53] demonstrates automatic
fingerprinting and real-time identification of Android applications from their encrypted network traffic, which
even could work when HTTPS/TLS is employed. Eskandari et al. [28] analyzed the personal data transfers in
mobile apps and revealed that 51% of these apps did not provide any privacy policy. The paper [15] demonstrates
discerning of mobile user location within commercial GPS resolution by leveraging the ability of mobile device
magnetometers to detect externally generated signals in a permissionless attack. Reaves et al. [47] did the security
analysis on the branchless banking applications. Different from them, we focus on the insecurity of the cellular
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Wi-Fi calling service, which is stipulated by the 3GPP and is going to be deployed globally on billions of mobile
devices in the near future.
Wi-Fi Security. There are many novel studies related to Wi-Fi security. Liu et al. [41] used the fine-grained
channel information to authenticate the user. Lee et al. [38] examined the limitations of the existing jamming
schemes against channel hopping Wi-Fi devices in dense networks. Li et al. [40] inferred user demographic
information by exploiting the meta-data of Wi-Fi traffic. Another study [22] proposes the system, the Wi-Fi
Privacy Ticker, to improve participants’ awareness of the circumstances in which their personal information is
transmitted. However, we here focus on a cellular network technology, Wi-Fi calling, the security of which is
different from that of conventional Wi-Fi networks.
Wi-Fi Calling Security. Wi-Fi calling security is a new research area and has not been fully studied by the
academic yet, since carriers just deployed their Wi-Fi calling services in recent years. Current researchers mainly
focus on the security vulnerabilities onWi-Fi calling devices. Specifically, Beekman et. al pointed out that T-Mobile
Wi-Fi calling devices (e.g., Samsung S2) are vulnerable to invalid server certificates [13]. Chalakkal et. al studied
SIM-related security issues on Wi-Fi calling devices [17]. However, our work examines the Wi-Fi calling security
from all the three aspects: standards, operations and implementations.
8 CONCLUSION
TheWi-Fi calling service is thriving and being deployed worldwide. In this work, we conduct the first study on the
security implication of the operational Wi-Fi calling service over three major U.S. operators and state-of-the-art
Wi-Fi calling devices (e.g., Google Nexus 6P, Apple iPhone 8, Samsung Galaxy S8). We discover four security
vulnerabilities which stem from the design defects of Wi-Fi calling standards (V1 and V4), operational slips (V3)
of operators, and implementation issues (V2) of Wi-Fi calling devices.
By exploiting the vulnerabilities and the state-of-the-art computer visual recognition technologies, adversaries
are able to infer the Wi-Fi calling user’s privacy and launch the telephony harassment or denial of voice service
attack. In the attack of user privacy leakage, adversaries can infer user identity, call statistics, device information,
personalities, mood, malicious behaviors, etc. In the attack of telephony harassment/DoS attack, the adversaries
are able to shut the essential voice/text services down on the victims’ smartphones while the security defenses
deployed by Wi-Fi calling service providers and device manufacturers are suppressed.
The fundamental issue is that the conventional security defenses well examined in cellular network services
are simply applied to the Wi-Fi calling service without considering its specific security threats. We thus propose
two remedies to alleviate real-world damages after getting to the root of the vulnerabilities. The ultimate solution
calls for a concerted effort among all parties involved.
The Wi-Fi calling service is still at its early rollout, so the lessons learned from three major U.S. carriers can
help secure mobile ecosystem and facilitate the global deployment, as well as provide new design insights for
upcoming 5G networks. We hope that our initial study will stimulate more research efforts on the Wi-Fi calling
service from both academia and industry.
9 UPDATES FROM INDUSTRY
To secure a number of Wi-Fi calling service users, we are contacting tested Wi-Fi calling service operators
(e.g., Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile) and device manufacturers (e.g., Google, Samsung, and Apple), reporting our
findings to them, and waiting for their responses. Currently, the Google Android security team has conducted
an initial severity assessment on our report (i.e., DoS attack against essential voice service on Nexus 6P ). They
confirmed the security issues we reported, classified them into the Low severity category, and promised that the
issues would be fixed at the next appropriate opportunity. Note that Google’s published severity assessment matrix
has strict rules to determine the severity of the security issues they received. For example, a local permanent
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denial of service attack (device requires a factory reset to recover) or remote temporary device denial of service
(cause devices to remotely hang or reboot) can be only considered a moderate severity issue (i.e., just one level
higher than Low severity). However, we do appreciate Google’s Android security team is willing to verify our
findings and release remedies to its users in a short time. We hope that other Wi-Fi calling device manufacturers
and service operators can take similar actions as Google did.
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